Prime Minister Stephen Harper arrived in China today for a
high
profile visit aimed at improving the Canada- China economic ties.
Many have noted the change in tone from the Canadian
government on China on rights issues, but the intellectual property
story is worth
noting here as well. Unlike a U.S. visit, which is likely to place IP
issues at the very top of the list, the Canadian visit is unlikely to
emphasize the issue. Indeed, Canada would do well to consider shifting
its approach to China on intellectual property.
While China-based
piracy is unquestionable a concern, Canada has too often used the issue
to curry favour with the U.S. at the expense of developing the China
relationship. In recent years, our support for the Anti-Counterfeiting
Trade Agreement (which
deliberately
excluded China)
and now the Trans Pacific Partnership (which also excludes China) does
little to help relations. China could be a strategic ally on global IP
issues as both countries face significant external pressure for reform.
While compliance with international rules should be the starting point
for any dialogue, focusing on the flexibility that exists at
international law to address domestic concerns is in both our interests.
The biggest Canadian blunder was the decision to join a U.S. complaint
against China at the World Trade Organization in 2007 alleging that
Chinaâs domestic laws, border measures, and criminal penalties for
intellectual property violations did not comply with its international
treaty obligations. The case was a
big loss.
China was required to amend parts of its copyright law but on the
big issues - border measures and IP enforcement - almost all of the
contested laws were upheld as valid.
More interesting are the background documents that demonstrate that the
Canadian government was unable to muster credible evidence of harm
among Canadian companies.
Interestingly, the key player in promoting
the case in Canada was the Canadian Recording Industry Association,
which appears to have worked closely with the U.S. government to
pressure Canadian officials to join the case. A
Wikileaks
cable notes that "CRIA is leading the charge to get the Government
of Canada to join the U.S. case." [the
same cable
also states that the Entertainment Software Association of Canada
"expects not to take a position, because not all of their members are
in agreement and because their members' IP is not Canada-based anyway."]
I chronicled the background information in a
column in
2009 based on documents obtained under the Access to Information
Act. The key findings:
Government records reveal that the
U.S. began to pressure Canada to join the case as a full party in 2006,
months before the case was formally filed with the WTO. In April
2006,
officials at the Department of Foreign Affairs asked the Beijing and
Shanghai consular offices for information on intellectual property
infringement problems, but neither provided much assistance.
Two months later, with the case
making little progress (in May, an RCMP official wondered aloud why
Canada was even concerned with enforcement in other countries), Foreign
Affairs launched a public consultation on intellectual property
enforcement abroad. The consultation was not limited to China, as
officials decided to keep it open-ended.
The consultation generated 55
responses, but officials hoping to build a solid case against China
were left sorely disappointed. According to a government summary
(the
consultation results have never been disclosed to the public and were
obtained under Access to Information), only one-third of the responses
specifically referenced China as a problem. In fact, there were
more
responses that criticized the United States and the consultation itself.
By the end of the summer, the U.S.
had provided Canadian officials with its legal arguments, but Canada
was without the evidence it needed to demonstrate harm and thereby
participate as a co-complainant in the case. Indeed, on the key
issue
involving criminal enforcement thresholds, a Department of Justice
official noted that Justice and RCMP guidelines used similar thresholds
for prosecutorial decisions and that the Chinese could effectively make
similar claims against Canada.
Given the weak position, Canadian
officials could not support becoming a co-complainant, instead
recommending that Canada join as a third party. Anticipating an
October 2006 complaint, a press release was prepared but was never
issued after the U.S. decided to delay launching the case.
With no complaint in sight, the
Canadian Recording Industry Association, which had been the most vocal
supporter of Canadian participation, met with senior Foreign Affairs
officials in January 2007. Documents prepared by department
officials
in advance of the meeting noted that CRIA's previous efforts to
encourage participation had "lacked specifics." The memo
concluded
that "we remain of the view that we do not have enough information
related to specific Canadian experiences and interests to go forward as
a co-complainant" and that "there is still no real concrete information
however, of Canadian interests that have been harmed in China."
Over the next few months, Canadian
officials grappled with several concerns as a U.S. complaint appeared
inevitable. For example, with plans for Canada to participate in
the
intellectual property case against China but not in a second case on
market access, officials feared that the Canadian steel industry would
voice its objections.
Further, as Canadian officials
drafted a formal letter of notification of its participation, a
Geneva-based official asked "do we have statistics to mention about
intellectual property owned by Canadians sold in China or something
like it to explain why we are interested?" Without solid
statistics,
the formal notification did not reference the issue, instead merely
stating Canada's "concern" with Chinese practices.
The U.S. commenced its action on
April 9, 2007. Canada filed its notification as a third party
participant two weeks later and within hours, CRIA wrote to Foreign
Affairs to offer its assistance on the case.
Given the weak position, Canadian
officials could not support becoming a co-complainant, instead
recommending that Canada join as a third party.